Introduction 1
The upswing in labour productivity in UK manufacturing which began in the 1980s occasioned much comment and a number of rival explanations were put forward (Muellbauer 1986; Oulton 1995) . One of the most popular hypotheses was that under the gun of the strong pound and the 1980-81 recession manufacturers simply closed their least productive plants or scrapped their least productive assets. So higher productivity was purchased at the cost of lower output and capacity. But two pieces of evidence militate against this view. First, in the 1980s there was a remarkable change in the (previously static) employment size distribution of manufacturing establishments: the proportion of employment in large plants shrank dramatically.
Large plants tend to have higher productivity than smaller ones, so if closure or scrapping were concentrated in large plants as the changing size distribution plus anecdotal evidence seem to suggest, then this would have reduced productivity growth, not enhanced it (Oulton 1987) . Second, according to the popular vintage capital model, under which older, less productive capital is scrapped first, the industries in which output had declined the most should have enjoyed the largest productivity gain. But this is not what happened (Oulton 1989 ).
An alternative explanation is that the trade union reforms of the 1980s removed important obstacles to productivity growth. The productivity improvement was greatest in industries which had previously been the most heavily unionised (Oulton 1990 ). Using in part a dataset developed in Oulton and O'Mahony (1994) , Bean and Crafts (1995) found that the productivity improvement had been largest in industries where multi-unionism had previously been the most prevalent.
2 A basic difficulty with these studies is that they all used industry level data. No direct measures of scrapping or closures were available. This is because researchers could 1 This research has been supported by the Department of Trade and Industry, to whom I owe thanks. I am grateful to Peter Hart for helpful comments and to the staff of the ONS at Newport for assistance in using the ARD. The usual disclaimer applies. 2 For further evidence on the role of trade unions, see Denny and Nickell (1992) and Gregg et al. (1993) . A pessimistic assessment of the effect of the Thatcher period reforms is Blanchflower and Freeman (1994) . Increasing competition may also have played a role (Haskel 1991; Redding and Proudman 1998). generally use only the published data from the Annual Census of Production.
3 By law the published results could not reveal the data relating to any individual manufacturing establishment. There is no way of knowing from the published data whether the establishments which were closed had lower or higher productivity than those which survived. Nor can one tell whether plants which were large in 1979, assuming they survived, enjoyed higher or lower productivity growth over the next decade than smaller ones.
All this has now changed with the advent of the ARD. The ARD is an electronic database of the Annual Census of Production (ACOP). 4 Though it is still an offence to publish the data relating to an ACOP respondent, the law now allows researchers (with the permission of the ONS) to study the individual returns to the Census.
Because establishments have a unique reference number the history of individual establishments can be traced over time.
The present paper compares productivity growth in the two cycles of 1973-79 and 1979-89 , though more attention is paid to the latter. 1973, 1979 and 1989 See however Lansbury and Mayes (1996) who discuss inter alia the relative productivity of entrants and exits in manufacturing. However, as their work predated the ARD, they were not able to trace the history of individual establishments. 4 ARD stands for ABI Respondents Database, and in turn ABI stands for Annual Business Inquiry. Annual Business Inquiry (Production) is the new name for ACOP.
The ARD
The ARD, or ABI Respondents Database to give it its full name, is an electronic database of the Annual Census of Production (ACOP). In principle, it includes all the data collected under ACOP from 1970 to the present. It covers the whole of the production sector, manufacturing plus mining and quarrying and, for recent years, construction (Oulton 1997) . In the present paper I use only the results for manufacturing.
Labour productivity is output per unit of labour. Three measures of output are available from the ARD. In descending order of size these are: gross output, net output and gross value added. I use gross value added (GVA), mainly because it is additive across establishments and industries. Hours worked are not measured in the Census so I use the total number employed as the denominator of the productivity ratio. GVA which is reported in current prices was converted to 1990 prices using producer price indexes for each Class of the 1980 SIC (of which there are 22 within manufacturing: see the Appendix).
5 For the period studied here, industry is recorded in the ARD under the 1980 SIC.
The most basic unit in the ARD is the "local unit", defined as a plant or office at a single location. Above that is the establishment, which is the reporting unit. An establishment consists of at least one local unit (itself) and may consist of more. Most of the data in the ARD (e.g. GVA) relate to the establishment as a whole. The establishment may or not be a company in the legal sense. In 1987, "company-based
reporting" was introduced into the Census and the reporting units are now referred to as "businesses". But the larger companies continued to be split up into smaller units. For Classes 21, 36 and 44 no PPI exists so the PPI for manufacturing as a whole was used. These deflators were obtained from Datastream. 6 It is not clear without further research how much difference this change made. For clarity, and because most of the data used here were collected before the change to company-based reporting, I continue to use the term "establishment". Note that in American usage an establishment is a plant and this should be borne in mind when comparing the present results with US ones, e.g. Baily et al. (1996) . Table 1 compares performance in UK manufacturing over the last two complete cycles, from peak to peak (see also charts 1-3). 7 In the first cycle of 6 years, output and employment both fell and productivity rose a meagre 2.8%. In the second cycle of 10 years, output rose a modest amount, employment fell by a quarter and productivity rose by an impressive 48%. We would like to know how the experience of individual establishments differed in these two periods.
Structural change in UK manufacturing, 1979-89
The period 1979-89 will be the one studied initially. In 1979, 17,965 manufacturing establishments were selected as respondents to the Census, out of some 108,000
classified to manufacturing. In 1979 as in 1989, establishments employing fewer than 20 were nearly all excluded and for those employing 20-49 the sampling fraction was 50%. 8 The sum of the gross value added reported by respondents is 82% of the figure published in the ACOP Summary Volume, which grosses up the total of selected respondents to allow for the non-selected ones. The total of selected employment is 80% of the published figure. For 1989, the corresponding percentages are 83% and 79%. These figures suggest that the Census achieved much the same level of coverage in both years, hence no adjustment was made on this account.
Establishments were however excluded from the analysis if (a) they were classified to manufacturing in 1979 but not in 1989 or the reverse (4 establishments) or (b) they had negative value added in either year (166 establishments in 1979 and 224 in 1989, with an aggregate negative value added of around £400m). This resulted in 17,733 establishments in 1979 and 18,714 in 1989 being eventually included in the analysis.
We distinguish between (1) survivors, which are those establishments which are present in both years; (2) exits, establishments present only in 1979; and (3) entrants, establishments present only in 1989. Output in 1979 was actually a bit lower than in 1978 but 1979 is a better year from the point of view of the availability of variables in the ARD. It seems quite likely that manufacturing is currently at another cyclical peak, but if so some time will have to elapse before it can be analysed: the most recent year available in the ARD is 1995.
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The sampling scheme was actually more complicated than this; see Oulton (1997). 9 This definition overstates the magnitude of entry and exit somewhat because of sampling in the Census. An establishment may be in existence in both years but only sampled in one. In both 1979 and 1989, half of establishments with 20-49 employees were sampled. Similarly, an establishment may be excluded altogether from the Census in one year on the grounds of size (normally because it has fewer than 20 employees) though it is large enough to include in another.
CHART 3
Manufacturing productivity, The explanation for why, amongst survivors, the median size fell by only 6% while the first moment median fell by 46% is that there was a huge decline in employment in large plants. We return to this topic below when the size distribution is discussed in more detail. 29.6 --
As mentioned in the introduction, a persistent notion about the 1980s is that it saw a substantial reduction in the number of low productivity plants. This impression is not borne out by the evidence of Table 2 . The dispersion of productivity across establishments, as measured by the standard deviation of the log of productivity (line 9), actually widened both overall and amongst survivors. Relative to the median productivity level, the bottom 5% of establishments actually did worse in 1989 than ten years earlier. Once again this was true both overall and for survivors. As for the upper tail, this rose relative to the median in the case of survivors though not overall.
Charts 4-7 show kernel density estimates of productivity levels for survivors, exits and entrants, and overall. They confirm the very wide dispersion which exists at any one time and they certainly show the existence of a very long tail of low productivity establishments in both years. 11 The dominant impression is of a rightward shift of the whole distribution, with little overall change in shape, between the two dates.
The distribution of productivity growth amongst survivors appears in Chart 8. To make the graph more readable, the 97 establishments who apparently experienced productivity growth exceeding 500% have been excluded. Even so, the distribution has pronounced positive skew: the mean growth is twice the median (with all observations included: lines 12 and 13, Table 2 ). A remarkable feature revealed by
Chart 8 is the substantial number of survivors with negative productivity growth. In fact, 2,191 survivors, more than a quarter of the total, fell into this category. Their mean size was 285 employees in 1979 and 239 in 1989, while their mean productivity growth was -27.6%.
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It is far from clear however that the UK is exceptional in this respect (Industry Economics and Statistics Directorate 1997).
CHART 4
Kernel density of log productivity, Source ARD.
CHART 6
Kernel density of log productivity Source ARD.
CHART 7
Kernel density of log productivity, 
Source

ARD.
Note Establishments with productivity growth exceeding 500% excluded.
Decomposing productivity growth
Suppose we divide manufacturing establishments up into a number of groups. We
wish to know what is the contribution of each group to overall productivity growth over a given period. A decomposition close to the one used by Baily et al. (1996) will be employed. Let Y it be output and E it be employment in group i at time t. Then labour productivity in group i is defined as
Labour productivity in the aggregate is: which can be decomposed as follows:
The first summation on the right hand side is the "within group" effect, the growth of productivity in each group weighted by its base period employment share. The second and third summations are reallocation effects. Aggregate productivity growth is raised if there is a rise in the labour share of groups with a higher than average productivity level in the base period (the second term). It is also raised if there is a rise in the share of groups with higher than average productivity growth (the third term). 12 In words, Aggregate productivity growth = Within group effect + Reallocation levels effect + Reallocation growth effect
The contribution of the ith group to aggregate productivity growth is therefore measured as:
We may also note that since growth is defined here in discrete terms, the relationship between productivity growth and the growth of output (Y) and employment (E) per period is:
The percentage growth over an interval of length T is normalised by dividing by T to facilitate comparisons of growth over intervals of different length. This convention is adopted so that our decompositions will continue to add up. Note that growth per period so defined is not the same as the annual average growth rate.
Decomposing productivity growth in practice, 1979-89
The role of closures
In aggregate, the output of ARD respondents rose by 11%, their employment fell by 29% and their productivity rose by 57% over the ten years 1979-89 (Table 3) .
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Exits accounted for 37% of employment in 1979 and productivity in these establishments was 17% lower than in survivors. So the disappearance of these establishments would certainly have raised productivity. But if nothing else had changed except for exits, i.e. no new entrants and no productivity growth in survivors, overall productivity would only have risen by 7%, whereas in reality it rose by 57% (5.66% per year, see Table 3 ). The official figures for aggregate manufacturing are reasonably close to these: see Table 1 . It must be remembered that real output is measured here as single deflated value added while the official series is a value added weighted average of real gross output indicators. Moreover the official employment series comes from the Census of Employment, not the Census of Production, which used a different register of businesses over this period. a. The growth rate of X from 0 to T is measured as (100/T)*(X T -X 0 )/X 0. Note that this is not the same as the average annual rate of growth. Note The relationship between the growth rates of productivity, value added and employment is given in equation (3).
Apart from exits, several other changes were going on at the same time. First, productivity did rise in survivors, by 51%. Second, the exits were replaced by new entrants which accounted for a third of 1989 employment. These new establishments had lower productivity than the survivors had attained by 1989, but the percentage gap was roughly half that between exits and survivors in 1979: 9% versus 17%. So overall productivity growth was raised not so much by the exit of low productivity establishments as by their replacement by entrants whose productivity was comparatively high, though still low in absolute terms.
A similar picture emerges if we do the same calculation for the peak to trough period of 1979-82, except that survivors play a larger role. Survivors over this 3 year period accounted for 84% of employment in 1979 and 87% in 1982. Exits had productivity which was 22% lower than survivors in 1979. They were replaced by entrants who had productivity 10% lower.
We now apply the decomposition of Baily et al. to analysing the role of closures. Table 4 shows the decomposition of productivity growth between survivors on the one hand and exits/entrants on the other. Survivors account for 61% of overall growth.
Virtually all their contribution is due to internal growth, the reallocation effects being small. The contribution of entrants and exits is also nearly all due to internal growth, not reallocation effects. a. Growth rates are annualised, e.g. growth of X from 0 to T is (100/T)*(X T -X 0 )/X 0 . Note Each group's contribution is given by equation (2). For further explanation see text.
Productivity growth amongst survivors: downsizing versus upsizing
Baily et al. (1996) have suggested a fourfold classification in terms of success or failure in raising productivity combined with whether or not employment rose (upsizers) or fell (downsizers). This scheme is illustrated in the following (Table 5 ).
The fastest rate of productivity growth was found in quadrant 2, at an annualised rate of 9.21%.
Applying the decomposition of Baily et al. we find not surprisingly that quadrant 2 accounts for the lion's share of productivity growth (Table 6 ). Nevertheless it is noteworthy that the successful upsizers account for 16% of overall growth. However, their positive contribution was almost exactly outweighed by the negative contribution of the other two quadrants (-15%). Baily et al. (1996) found a much larger role for quadrant 1 in the US over the period 1977-87. But it must be remembered that in the US employment fell by only 4.5% over 1977-87, compared with 25.4% in the UK in our period. a. The growth rate of X from 0 to T is measured as (100/T)*(X T -X 0 )/X 0. Note that this is not the same as the average annual rate of growth. Note The relationship between the growth rates of productivity, value added and employment is given in equation (3). a. Growth rates are annualised, e.g. growth of X from 0 to T is (100/T)*(X T -X 0 )/X 0 . Note Each group's contribution is given by equation (2). For further explanation see text.
Productivity growth amongst survivors: the role of establishment size
We look now in more detail at the role of size. In general, the productivity level in 1979 rose with size although the maximum is reached in the band 4,000-4,999 employees. Productivity growth also rises with size with exceptionally rapid growth in the top size class. However this size class was also the fastest shedder of labour. In the terminology of the previous sub-section, the lowest four size classes were successful upsizers, while the remainder were successful downsizers. Table 8 shows the contribution of each size class to productivity growth. The top size class, a mere 36 establishments, accounts for almost a third of aggregate productivity growth. By contrast, establishments employing fewer than 500, though 29% of 1979 employment, account for only 15% of productivity growth. Reallocation effects turn out to be quite important when the decomposition is by size. Overall, they reduce the growth which would otherwise have occurred by an annualised 0.72%. Most of this effect is due to the fact that the establishments which grew fastest were also the biggest downsizers.
It is apparent that downsizing has played an important role in the productivity growth a. Growth rates are annualised, e.g. growth of X from 0 to T is (100/T)*(X T -X 0 )/X 0 . Note that this is not the same as the average annual rate of growth. Note The relationship between the growth rates of productivity, value added and employment is given in equation (3). 1989: 18,714 establishments with total employment of 3.820 million.
Disaggregating to the sector level
So far the results have been at the level of all manufacturing. But it is of interest to see whether any differences emerge at lower levels of aggregation. Table 10 a. The growth rate of X from 0 to T is measured as (100/T)*(X T -X 0 )/X 0. Note that this is not the same as the average annual rate of growth.
Note Classes 21 and 26 and Quadrant 4 of Class 23 are omitted to avoid disclosure, since these had only a handful of surviving establishments. See the Appendix for the names of the Classes.
A comparison with 1973-79
The period 1973 to 1979 was one in which, using aggregate statistics, manufacturing employment fell by 7.0%, output fell by 4.2% and productivity rose by 2.8% (see Table 1 and Charts 1-3). 1973 was a cyclical peak and 1974-75 were recession years, associated with the first oil shock. The period was marked by extensive government intervention, including incomes policies and the bailing out of lame ducks, and is also notorious for bad labour relations. It therefore provides a natural basis for comparison with 1979-89.
Tables 11-17 do the same analysis for 1973-79 as has just been done for 1979-89.
Getting on for 10,000 establishments, accounting for a quarter of employment, exited between 1973 and 1979. This was a lower proportion than during the subsequent cycle. However, the latter was longer, 11 years peak to peak as opposed to 7. The mean productivity level of survivors fell by 6% over this period. Changes in establishment size were fairly small. In 1973 a "typical" worker worked in an establishment employing 991 people; his 1979 counterpart worked in one employing 956 workers. There was little change in the dispersion of productivity over this period (Table 11) .
As in 1979-89, the establishments which exited had lower productivity than the survivors, by 12%. Interestingly, the entrants had higher productivity than the survivors in 1979. Tables 12 and 13, to be compared with Tables 3 and 4 , show the arithmetic. Productivity fell amongst survivors, but this was outweighed by the entry and exit process, so the period as a whole shows a small rise in productivity. a. The growth rate of X from 0 to T is measured as (100/T)*(X T -X 0 )/X 0. Note that this is not the same as the average annual rate of growth. Note The relationship between the growth rates of productivity, value added and employment is given in equation (3). When we do the analysis by quadrants (Tables 14 and 15, compare Tables 5 and 6), we find the big difference between the two cycles lies in the employment share of successful downsizers (quadrant 2). These accounted for under a third of employment in 1973 compared to two thirds in 1979. The counterpart was much large shares for unsuccessful downsizers and upsizers (quadrants 3 and 4). These two quadrants, in which by definition productivity fell, accounted for 54% of initial employment; the corresponding percentage for 1979-89 was 18%. Quadrant 1, the successful upsizers, had a similar employment share in both cycles. Indeed it made a larger contribution to overall productivity growth amongst survivors in the first than in the second cycle.
But its contribution was more than outweighed by poor performance in the other quadrants. a. The growth rate of X from 0 to T is measured as (100/T)*(X T -X 0 )/X 0. Note that this is not the same as the average annual rate of growth. Note The relationship between the growth rates of productivity, value added and employment is given in equation (3). For successful downsizers (quadrant 2), productivity growth was quite rapid at an annualised 6.29% compared with 9.21% in the later cycle. But because of its smaller share, the contribution of this quadrant was about the same as that of quadrant 1. The contributions of the other two quadrants were necessarily negative. Ignoring sign, all four quadrants made contributions of roughly equal size. a. Growth rates are annualised, e.g. growth of X from 0 to T is (100/T)*(X T -X 0 )/X 0 . Note that this is not the same as the average annual rate of growth. Note The relationship between the growth rates of productivity, value added and employment is given in equation (3). Tables 16 and 17 analyse productivity growth in survivors by employment size in   1973 (compare Tables 7 and 8 ). Employment rose moderately in establishment with under 500 employees and fell in larger establishments (except for the top size class).
But whereas in 1979-89 productivity rose strongly in all size classes, and exceptionally rapidly in the largest, in 1973-79 productivity fell in 10 out of 14 size classes; in the other 4 classes, growth was very modest. In consequence, each size class made a small, mostly negative, contribution to overall productivity growth. a. The growth rate of productivity q from 0 to T is measured as (100/T)*(q T -q 0 )/q 0. Note that this is not the same as the average annual rate of growth. Note Each group's contribution is given by equation (2). For further explanation see text.
Conclusions
The main conclusions are as follows:
1. Over 1979-89, the dispersion of productivity across establishments actually increased. The so-called long tail of under-performers lengthened. There was huge variation in the growth of productivity. Amongst surviving establishments, a quarter experienced negative productivity growth and these accounted for 18% of employment in 1979 and 21% in 1989.
2. Over 1979-89, closures are not able to explain the upsurge in productivity which occurred. True, establishments which disappeared had lower productivity than those which survived. But this by itself would have had only a small effect on overall productivity. Moreover the establishments which disappeared were replaced by new entrants which also had comparatively low productivity.
3. The bulk of productivity growth can be ascribed to establishments where employment fell. This is true both in aggregate and at the sectoral level.
Nevertheless, establishments in which employment grew accounted for 16% of productivity growth, despite the 25% fall in employment in manufacturing as a whole.
4. Productivity growth was highest in the largest establishments. In fact, the top 36 establishments, each with 7,500 or more workers and employing 17% of the 1979 workforce, accounted for almost a third of aggregate productivity growth.
5. In the earlier cycle of 1973-79, productivity growth was quite rapid in those establishments where it rose at all. The problem was that amongst survivors, over half of employment was in establishments in which productivity fell.
The purpose of this paper has been mainly descriptive. Much further work is clearly needed to examine the determinants of entry and exit and the causes of productivity growth.
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In a companion paper I examine the role of physical investment in explaining productivity growth (Oulton 1998) .
